SECURITIES-FRAuD-ONE

WITH REGULAR ACCESS TO MARKET
INFORMATION VIOLATES RULE 10b-5 WHEN TRADING IN SECURITIES WITHOUT DISCLOSING THAT INFORMATION-United

States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. granted,
99 S. Ct. 2158 (1979).
Vincent Chiarella was employed as a "markup" man ' by Pandick
Press, one of the many Wall Street printing firms. 2 During the
course of his employment, he was made privy to certain confidential
information concerning tender offers 3 and mergers. 4 Pandick had
received some of this vital information in coded form 5 in order to
preserve the confidentiality of the parties involved. 6 On five separate occasions from 1975 to 1976, Mr. Chiarella, a knowledgeable investor, 7 gleaned from these secret documents the names of the corporations involved in the takeovers. 8 Before the news releases of the
I United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.7d 1358, 1363 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct.
2158 (1979). As a "markup" man, Chiarella worked in the composing room. The customers "copy" reached him first and it was his job to "determin[e] the size, style and depth of
the type, and [to disseminate] the pages to copy cutters." Brief for the United States of America
at 3, United States v. Chiarella, 450 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) [hereinafter cites as Brief for
U.S.].
2 588 F.2d at 1363. Financial printers, such as Pandick, service investment houses, banks,
corporations and other large institutions. They handle various business documents which include prospectuses, proxies, registration statements, merger proposals and tender offers. Brief
for U.S., supra note 1, at 3.
s 588 F.2d at 1363. The tender offer is a technique utilized in the process of corporate
takeovers. The acquiring corporation, the offeror, makes a public offer to buy all or part of the
outstanding shares of the target corporation for a price generally above the prevailing fair market value. Fleischer & Mundheim, CorporateAcquisition by Tender Offer, 115 U. PA. L. REv.
317, 317 (1967). For a more detailed analysis of the tender offer, see 1 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAV: FRAUD, § 6.3 at 119-24 (1975).
4 588 F.2d at 1363 n.2. The parties involved stipulated that the form of the takeovers was
not significant. Id. Of the five involved, four were tender offers and, one was a merger. Id.
5 588 F.2d at 1363. The names of the corporations were either left blank or coded. Id. For
example, when Emhart Corporation made a tender offer for USM Corporation, Pandick received the documents with "'Arabia Corp."' and "'U.S.A. Corp."' as the principals. Id.
6 Because of the premium being offered for target shares, it was feared that a premature
leak to the public would result in a dramatic rise in the market price of the target companies'
stock. 588 F.2d at 1363; see generally I A. BROMBERG, supra note 3, at 119-23; Fleischer &
Mundheim, supra note 3, at 317-28.
7 588 F.2d at 1363. Chiarella had more than a mere peripheral interest in the vagaries of
Wall Street, as evidenced by his frequent conversations with his stock broker. On many occasions he placed as many as 10 to 15 calls a day to him. Id.
1 Id. The documents Chiarella received provided vital information, such as the market in
which the shares were traded, the par value, the number of shares outstanding, and the highs
and lows for the previous year. Brief for U.S., supra note 1, at 5; see 588 F.2d at 1363. By
comparing these figures with a stock guide book he received from his broker, Chiarella cleverly
deduced the names of the subject corporations. Brief for U.S., supra note 1, at 5.
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tender offers were published and without disclosing the material 9
nonpublic information he had discovered, Mr. Chiarella purchased
shares in the target companies. 10 After the tender offers were filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the proposed takeovers announced, the market price of the target companies
increased dramatically." Chiarella, then, immediately sold his newly
acquired stock without waiting to ascertain whether or not the
takeover attempts were successful. 1 2 These transactions netted
Chiarella a thirty thousand dollar profit. 13
In May 1977, as a result of an SEC investigation concerning his
trading activity, Chiarella disgorged all his profits 14 pursuant to a
consent decree, 1 5 and was consequently fired by Pandick Press.1 6 In
January 1978, he was indicted 17 on seventeen counts 18 of securities
fraud for trading on material nonpublic information in violation of sec9 The parties stipulated that knowledge of the impending tender offers was material. 588
F.2d at 1364 n.5. "The basic test of'materiality' . .. is whether 'a reasonable man would attach
importance in determining his choice of action in the transaction in question."' List v. Fashion
Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir. 1965) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538
2(a) (1938)). For a more detailed discussion of materiality, see SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,
401 F.2d 833, 849-50 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); Kohler v. Kohler Co.,
319 F.2d 634, 642 (7th Cir. 1963); Allen, Rule 10b-5 and the Burger Court-Time to Reexamine
the Elements for a 10b-5 Action, 82 CoM. L. J. 118, 123-26 (1977).
10 588 F.2d at 1363.

11Id.; see generally 1 A. BROMBERG, supra note 3, at 119-23; Fleischer & Mundheim,
supra note 3.
12 Brief for U.S., supra note 1, at 6.
13 588 F.2d at 1363.

14 Id. at 1364. Chiarella's profits were distributed to the persons who actually sold him the
target stock. Id. None of the so-called "victims" had any knowledge of the impending tender
offers or mergers. Brief for U.S., supra note 1, at 1. Three of these "victims" actually testified
that, had they known of the takeover proposals, they would not have sold their shares. Id.
15 588 F.2d at 1364.
16 Id.

17The indictment was brought pursuant to the penalty provision of section 32(a) of the 1934
Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78 FF(a) (1976). Section 32(a) provides that either a fine
of not more than $10,000, or imprisonment for not more than 5 years or both, can be imposed

on any person convicted of violating "any provision of this chapter ... or any rule or regulation
thereunder, the violation of which is made unlawful." Id. § 78 FF(a). However, the statute
specifically provides that no person shall be subject to imprisonment if he does not possess the
requisite intent. Id. Whether or not Chiarella knew of the regulation or had the requisite
intent, while addressed by the court, is not the focus of this note. For a discussion of these
issues, see 588 F.2d at 1369-73.
58 588 F.2d at 1364. Each count represented one of Chiarella's seventeen individual purchases of target company stock. After each purchase Chiarella received a confirmation slip in the
mail from his broker. Id. at 1364 n.6.
It was this use of the mails that triggered the invocation of federal jurisdiction under rule
10b-5. Id. The jurisdictional requirements of interstate commerce or use of the mails have
historically been broadly interpreted to allow a wide application of the federal securities laws.
See Creswell-Keith, Inc. v. Willingham, 264 F.2d 76, 80 (8th Cir. 1959). Moreover, the courts
have held that the relationship or importance of the use of the mails to the outcome of the
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tion 10b of the Securities Exchange Act of 193419 and rule 10b-5
promulgated thereunder. 20 Chiarella moved to dismiss the indict21
ment on the ground that it failed to charge him with a crime.
The district court, in United States v. Chiarella,2 2 denied his
motion to dismiss, holding that Chiarella's actions constituted fraud
on two different levels. 23 As to the sellers of the target stock, his
purchases and failure to disclose tainted the transactions with "inherent unfairness" 2 4 and constituted a deceptive device. 25 His actions
fraudulent act need not be pivotal and may even be "'entirely incidental to it.'" United States
v. Brown, 555 F.2d 336, 340 (2d Cir. 1977) (quoting United States v. Cashin, 281 F.2d 669,
673-74 (2d Cir. 1960)). Thus, any use of the mails in connection with a fraudulent scheme to
purchase or sell securities is sufficient to confer jurisdiction. Mathews, Criminal Prosecution

Under the Federal Securities Laws and Related Statutes, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 901, 921-22
(1971).

The confirmation slip sent by a broker-dealer to a purchaser through the mails has been the
most commonly used means for invoking the federal securities laws for criminal violations. id. at
921.
19 15 U.S.C. § 78(j)(b) (1970). The statute provides in pertinent part:
[Ilt shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails or of any facility of
any national securities exchange(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
Id.
20 United States v. Chiarella, 450 F. Supp. 95, 95-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 588 F.2d
1358
(2d Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 2158 (1979). Rule 1Ob-5 reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977).
21 United States v. Chiarella, 450 F. Supp. at 96.
22 450 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), affd, 588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 99
S. Ct. 2158 (1979).
23 Id. at 95-96.
24 Id. at 97. The phrase "inherent unfairness" was first utilized in connection with the antifraud provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in the context of analyzing the obligations of
corporate insiders. See In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961). It was considered
unfair for officers, directors, and controlling shareholders to trade on and profit from information
unavailable to those with whom they were dealing. Id.
25 450 F. Supp. at 97.
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also defrauded the offering companies in that his purchases created an
artificial demand in the target companies' stock, which prematurely
inflated the price, thus increasing the costs to the acquiring corporations.2 6 Chiarella was found guilty on all counts and sentenced to
one year imprisonment.2 7
On appeal, Chiarella contended that, since he was not an insider
of the target corporations, he owed no fiduciary duty to the sellers of
target company shares, thus rendering the "disclose or abstain" rule 28
inapplicable.2 9 Consequently, there was no violation of rule 10b-5
and no commission of a crime. 30 His contentions were rejected by
the Second Circuit in United States v. Chiarella.3 1 Judge Kaufman,
speaking for the court, held that Chiarella, as a market insider 32 with
regular access to market information, 33 had an affirmative duty of dis-

26

Id.

27 588 F.2d at 1364 n.7. After one month's imprisonment, Chiarella's sentence was sus-

pended and he was placed on probation for five years. Id.
28 The "disclose or abstain" rule was first enunciated in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401
F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). The rule requires that
anyone in possession of material inside information must either disclose it to the
investing public, or, if he is disabled from disclosing it in order to protect a corporate confidence . . . must abstain from trading in or recommending the securities
concerned while such inside information remains undisclosed.
Id.
29 588 F.2d at 1364. Although the disclose or abstain rule is prefaced by the pronoun "anyone" and rule lOb-5 by "any person," their interpretation has not been so inclusive. The scope
of their application has generally been limited to insiders and their tippees. Radiation Dynamics
Inc. v. Goldmuntz, 464 F.2d 876, 887, 890 (2d Cir. 1972); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F.
Supp. 808, 829 (D. Del. 1951); 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REG. 1450-53 (2d ed. 1961); 6 L. Loss,
supra, at 3559-71 (1969), and "persons with a special relationship to the company affected by
the information." Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry Into the Responsibility
To Disclose Market Information, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 798, 804 (1973). See Painter, Inside Information: Growing Pains for the Development of Federal Corporation Law Under Rule 10b-5,
65 COL. L. REV. 1361, 1383 (1965).

30 588 F.2d at 1364.
31 588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 2158 (1979).

32 As a financial printer, Chiarella was deemed to be inside the market. Id. at 1364. Financial printers by necessity are constantly made privy to sensitive and confidential information,
and their services "are a prerequisite for the successful execution of a tender offer." Id. Thus,
the court found it was irrelevant that Chiarella was not an insider of the companies in which he
traded. Id. Being located in such a strategic position, Chiarella and others who occupy similar
positions should not be allowed to benefit financially from the information entrusted to them.
Id. at 1365. For a more detailed discussion of market insiders, see Fleischer, Mundheim &
Murphy, supra note 29, at 845-50.
23 Market information is generally characterized as outside information because it is generated by forces outside the affected corporation. Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, supra note
29, at 807. It "affect(s) the market for a company's securities ... [without affecting] the company's assets or earning power." Id. at 799. For example, information that the trust department
of a large bank is about to heavily invest in a particular security is market information, as is
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closure as to the target sellers. 3 4 In so doing, Judge Kaufman rejected the argument that expanding rule 10b-5 to include within its
of
parameters Chiarella's conduct "would be so novel a construction
35
the Rule as to violate the fair notice element of due process."
Judge Meskill, in a vigorous dissent, stated that rule 10b-5 had
been consistently interpreted to limit the imposition of a duty of disclosure to insiders, their tippees, and those "'persons with a special
relationship to the company affected by the information.' "36 He

news of an impending tender offer. JENNINGS & MARSH, SECURITY REGULATIONS 952 (4th ed.
1976). The demand for the stock will immediately increase, concomitantly raising its price, yet
the earnings and assets of the corporation will not be affected. Id.
34 588 F.2d at 1365. The court specifically held that "[a]nyone-corporate insider or notwho regularly receives material nonpublic information may not use that information to trade in
securities without incurring an affirmative duty to disclose." Id. Chiarella did not have the
option to disclose, since by virtue of his employment, he owed a duty to the offering corporations to keep the news of the impending tender offers confidential. Id. at 1365 n.9.
35 Id. at 1369. Chiarella contended that section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 are unconstitutionally
vague. Brief for Defendant-Appellant Chiarella at 33, United States v. Chiarella, 450 F. Supp.
95 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 2158
(1979). He claimed to have been deprived of due process of law because his conviction was
based upon a statute that "'fail[ed] to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his
contemplated conduct is forbidden."' Id. (quoting United States v. Harris, 347 U.S. 612, 617
(1954)). The majority rejected Chiarella's argument and held that "[a]ll that is necessary is that
'a clear and definite statement of the conduct proscribed' antedate the actions alleged to be
criminal." 588 F.2d at 1369 (quoting United States v. Persky, 520 F.2d 283, 288 (2d Cir. 1975)).
The court found that Chiarella had adequate notice of potential criminal liability due to a recent
well publicized case involving another financial printer. 588 F.2d at 1369 (referring to SEC v.
Sorg Printing Co., [1974-75 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,034 (S.D.N.Y.
March 28, 1975)). Moreover, the court noted that Pandick had posted numerous signs throughout the shop warning its employees that trading on information obtained from customers' copy
was in violation of the securities laws. 588 F.2d at 1369. Since Sorg, three additional consent
decrees were obtained by the SEC against other financial printers. SEC v. Manderano, [19771978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
96,357 (D.N.J. March 22, 1978); SEC v.
Primar Typographers, Inc., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,734
(S.D.N.Y. 1976); SEC v. Ayoub, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
$ 95,567 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
Judge Meskill in his dissent urged the court to take heed of recent Supreme Court caveats
to slow down the expansion of section 10(b) "lest it take over 'the whole corporate universe.'"
588 F.2d at 1377 (Meskill, J., dissenting) (quoting Santa Fe, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 472, 480
(1977)); see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 212-14 (1976) (scienter necessary element under rule 10b-5); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 733-36 (1975)
(right of action under section 10(b) limited to purchasers and sellers of securities).
More specifically, Judge Meskill argued that, as to criminal violations, section 10(b) should
be construed more narrowly, and invoked only in response to egregious violations. 588 F.2d at
1377-78 (Meskill, J., dissenting); e.g., United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 411 (1973).
The issues of due process, and the interpretation of rule 10b-5, in a criminal as opposed to
civil context, are not the focus of this note, and will not be discussed further.
36 588 F.2d at 1373 (Meskill, J., dissenting) (quoting Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy,
supra note 29, at 804).
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contended that the creation of a new category of market insider (a
person having regular access to material nonpublic information) and
its inclusion within rule 10b-5 was unsupported by prior law, and was
37
inappropriate in a criminal proceeding.
To determine the full range and impact of rule 10b-5 a brief
analysis of the legislative history of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (1934 Act) 3 8 is necessary. As a result of the stock market crash
of 1929, confidence in the financial markets of the United States had
40
plummeted. 3 9 In an effort to promote and restore this confidence,
the 1934 Act of which section 10(b) is a part, was enacted. Eight
years later, rule 10b-5 was adopted to clarify what conduct section
10(b) made unlawful, 41 and to close a loophole in the federal antifraud provisions. 4 2 Collectively, they were designed to protect the
investing public by fostering full disclosure and dissemination of information 4 3 and by providing a marketplace free from manipulative
44
and deceptive practices.
Under the common law, ordinary purchasers and sellers of securities were not bound by any affirmative duty of disclosure.4 5 The
earlier common law decisions considered only "outright lie[s]" as de37

588 F.2d at 1373 (Meskill, J., dissenting).

38 15 U.S.C. § 78a-kk (1976).

39 See H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-5 (1933); S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. 1-5 (1934); see also 1 L. Loss SECURITIES REGULATION 119-28 (1961). The Wall Street

capitalist before the passage of the 1934 Act was viewed as a "'bloated cigar-smoking plutocrat
wearing a top hat, a cutaway, striped pants, and a dollar sign for a watch fob as he tramples on
widows and orphans.'" Schotland, Unsafe At Any Price: A Reply to Manne, Insider Trading and
the Stock Market, 53 VA. L. REV. 1425, 1440 n.53 (1967) (quoting J. BROOKS, THE SEVEN FAT
YEARS: CHRONICLES OF WALL STREET 169 (1958)).
40 Barnet, Neither a Tipper nor a Tippee, Be, 8

Hous. L. REV. 278, 279 (1970).
41 See Barnet, supra note 40, at 279; 3 L. Loss, supra note 29, at 1426-27.
42 Barnet, supra note 40, at 279. Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976)
had been interpreted as only prohibiting fraud as to the sellers of securities. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 463 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952); Barnet v.
Anaconda Co., 238 F. Supp. 766, 774 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). This enabled corporate insiders to
purchase stock on the basis of inside information with relative impunity. 3 L. Loss, supra note
29, at 1426. In response to this practice, rule 10b-5 was promulgated in order to prohibit fraud
by any person involved in the purchase or sale of securities. Barnet, supra note 40, at 279; see
In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 913-14 (1961).
43 See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, 495 F.2d 228, 235 (2d Cir.
1974); Crane v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 793 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 822 (1970); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
44 Fleischer, Securities Trading and Corporate Information Practices: The Implications of
the Texas Gulf Sulphur Proceeding, 51 VA. L. REV. 1271, 1279 (1965).
45 Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule 10b-5, 57 Nw. L. REV. 627, 667 (1963). Two theories
were first utilized to make nondisclosure of material information a fraudulent act; the "special
facts" doctrine and traditional fiduciary concepts. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d
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ceitful, 46 and only gradually, did half-truths become included as prohibited conduct. 4 7 Section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, however, are
broader in scope, designed to reach "'misleading or deceptive activities, whether or not they are precisely and technically sufficient to
sustain a common law action for fraud and deceit.' -48 Rule 10b-5
clearly prohibits any person from making material misrepresentations
49
or half-truths in connection with a purchase or sale of a security.
833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). Under the latter theory, nondisclosure was actionable by the person whom the fiduciary had a duty to protect. Jennings, Insider
Trading in Corporate Securities: A Survey of Hazards and Disclosure Obligations under Rule
lOb-5, 62 Nw. L. REV. 809: 815 (1968); see List v. Fashion Park Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 461 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965). Mere nondisclosure without a fiduciary relationship did
not constitute a breach of duty, and hence, was not deemed fraudulent. Jennings, supra at 810;
see Trussel v. United States, 228 F. Supp. 757, 762 (D. Colo. 1964). The fiduciary, on the other
hand, was subject to a much higher standard which Judge Cardozo described as "H[not honesty
alone, but the punctilio of an honor .... " Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 459, 164 N.E.
545, 546 (C.A. 1928). However, since insiders could sell on national exchanges and owe no
fiduciary duty to the buyer, the SEC in 1961 stated that the existence of a fiduciary relationship
should not be relevant in determining liability under rule 10b-5. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40
S.E.C. 907, 913-14 (1961) (dictum); accord, Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270, 273 (9th Cir. 1961).
The special facts doctrine was first enunciated in Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909). It
imposed a duty on officers and directors when purchasing the stock of their own company to
disclose the value of those shares even when no fiduciary relationship existed, if "special facts"
were present. Id. at 431. Rule 10b-5 has gradually expanded the "special facts" doctrine to
include a wider range of potential insiders. Id.
46 See 3 L. Loss, supra note 29, at 1431, 1433.
The "Kansas rule" which represented the minority view, scrutinized transactions between
directors and shareholders with more circumspection and included nondisclosure as grounds for
deceit. See Hotchkiss v. Fisher, 136 Kan. 530, 16 P.2d 531 (Sup. Ct. 1,32). In Hotchkiss, the
court held that it was fraudulent for a director not to communicate all the material facts in
connection with the purchase of stock from a shareholder. Id. at 536, 16 P.2d at 534.
7 3 L. Loss, supra note 29, at 1433-34.
48 Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 802 (5th Cir. 1970); see List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340
F.2d 457, 461-62 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965). The common law elements of the
action for deceit are:
1. A false representation made by the defendant. In the ordinary case, this representation must be one of fact.
2. Knowledge or belief*on the part of the defendant that the representation is
false-or, what is regarded as equivalent, that he has not a sufficient basis of information to make it. This element often is given the technical name of "scienter."
3. An intention to induce the plaintiff to act or to refrain from action in reliance
upon the misrepresentation.
4. Justifiable reliance upon the representation on the part of the plaintiff, in taking
action or refraining from it.
5. Damage to the plaintiff, resulting from such reliance.
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 685 (4th ed. 1971).

These elements of deceit, it should be noted, were not consciously or especially molded for
the floatation of securities. See Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Act, 43 YALE L.J.
227 (1933).
49 W. PAINTER, FEDERAL RECULATION OF INSIDER TRADING 137 (1968). Clause two of rule
10b-5 forbids a material misstatement, or silence when clarification is necessary to make state-
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However, there is ambiguity when non-disclosure is the basis of the
fraudulent act. 50 Since silence is not specifically prohibited by rule
10b-5, a determination must be made as to what circumstances will
trigger a duty to disclose inside information."
The drafters of the anti-fraud provisions had hoped to identify
certain classes-of people and categorically bar them from exploiting
their positions. 52 One of the primary purposes of rule 10b-5 was to
curb the unscrupulous use of inside information by corporate insiders. 53 Determining what other groups should also be classified as
insiders, and hence under a duty to disclose, 54 has been a difficult
ments, that were already made, not misleading. Fleischer, supra note 44, at 1277; see Kardon
v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 801 n.1 (E.D. Pa. 1947). These categories of misconduct are violations regardless of who the purchaser or seller is. Fleischer, supra note 44, at
1277. Thus, a person with no fiduciary duty or relationship to the company involved is in
violation of rule 10b-5 if he makes a material misrepresentation in connection with a purchase or
sale of securities. Id. However, a more difficult issue is presented when the fraud is perpetrated
through nondisclosure, which is generally the case when the trading is conducted on a national
exchange. Id. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). Thus, the question of when the federal securities laws impose a
duty to speak is a crucial one. For a discussion of this duty, see notes 57-104 infra and accompanying text.
50 Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, supra note 29, at 802-03. Generally the courts have
not been specific as to which clause of the rule imposes a duty to disclose in silence cases, but
rather, they have alluded to the rule as a whole to imply this special obligation. E.g., List v.
Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965) (plaintiff not
required to rely on any specific clause of rule); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808,
829 (D. Del. 1951), aff'd, 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956) (nondisclosure can violate all three
clauses).
Some courts and commentators, however, have specifically found that clause two of the
rule is inapplicable to nondisclosure cases, limiting the analysis to clauses one and three. See
Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); 3 L. Loss, supra note 29,
at 1439.
Si Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, supra note 29, at 803. When silence is the sole basis of
the l0b-5 claim, the duty of disclosure has been found to emanate from either a relationship
between the defendant and the issuing corporation, W. PAINTER, supra note 49, at 132-33; see
In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961), or from "'access .. . to information
intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone.'" SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
976 (1969); see notes 57-74 infra and accompanying text.
52 Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, supra note 29, at 817; see Speed v. Transamerica
Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 828 (D. Del. 1951), aff'd, 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956).
as Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 829 (D. Del. 1951), aff'd, 235 F.2d 369
(3d Cir. 1956); Allen, supra note 9, at 118. But cf. H. MANNE, IN DEFENSE OF INSIDER
TRADING 113 (1966). Professor Manne theorizes that insider trading is a necessary stimulant to
promote the "entrepreneurial function in large corporations." Id.
54 Rule lOb-5 protects against fraud, not silence; there is no specific requirement to disclose
any superior information. 588 F.2d at 1374-75 (Meskill, J.,dissenting). Hence, a duty to disclose arises only when it is fraudulent to remain silent. Id. at 1375 & n.3; see W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS § 106 (4th ed. 1971). See also General Time Corp. v. Talley

Indus., Inc., 403 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969) (offering corpora-
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and much litigated issue. 5 5 The result has been a gradual expansion
56
of the definition of corporate insiders.
In In re Cady Roberts & Co., 5 7 the SEC held that corporate
insiders do not exhaust the groups of persons upon whom rule 10b-5
imposes a special obligation to disclose or abstain. 58 Cady involved
a partner in a brokerage firm, Gintel, who sold Curtiss-Wright stock
immediately following the corporation's decision to lower its dividend. 5 9 Gintel sold before the news was publicly announced, based

tion allowed to purchase shares of target company without incurring a duty to disclose intended
takeover).
15 E.g., Crane v. Westinghouse Air Brake, 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 822 (1970); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947); In re
Hughes & Treat, 22 S.E.C. 623 (1946); In re Ward La France Truck Corp., 13 S.E.C. 373
(1943).
56 Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, supra note 29, at 818. Corporations and individuals
involved in takeover attempts have frequently been deemed insiders of the target company.
E.g., Crane v. Westinghouse Air Brake, 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822
(1970); In re Ward La France Truck Corp., 13 S.E.C. 373 (1943). In both of these cases, the
acquiring companies either had access to inside information, 13 S.E.C. at 375-78, or were
acting in concert with the target company. 419 F.2d at '796. If an outsider, however, acts
independently in his effort to acquire control, he is not deemed "to have an insider's obligation
...until such time as his purchases give him a controlling person's access to inside information." 3 L. Loss, supra note 29, at 1452; see General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., Inc., 403
F.2d 159, 164 (2d Cir. 1968); Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540, 545-47 (2d
Cir. 1967); Mills v. Sarjem Corp., 133 F. Supp. 753, 764-65 (D.N.J. 1955). Before the passage
of the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d), 78n(d) (1968), there was ambiguity as to the exact
point at which the purchaser acquired enough shares to be considered a controlling shareholder
and hence, an insider. See, 3 L. Loss, supra note 29, at 1451-52. The Williams Act allows an
outsider to acquire up to five percent of the target company's shares without incurring any duty
to disclose his takeover intentions. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d), 78n(d) (1968).
Key employees have been considered insiders and subject to the disclosure rule when they
used inside information obtained during the course of their employment for their own personal
benefit. E.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 843 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 976 (1969) (geologist-engineer, chief geologist, accountant, and office manager were
considered corporate insiders and under duty to disclose or abstain).
Tippees are also subject to the trading prohibitions of rule 10b-5. E.g., Ross v. Licht, 263
F. Supp. 395, 409-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); In re Investors Management Co., Inc. [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $ 77,832.
57 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
58 40 S.E.C. at 912. The Commission felt that the special obligation imposed on officers,
directors, and controlling shareholders should also be imposed on those persons with a "special
relationship" to a company which makes them privy to inside information. Id.
" Id. at 908-09. Between November 6 and November 23, 1959, Gintel purchased nearly
11,000 shares of Curtiss-Wright stock for customers' discretionary accounts. Id. at 908. On
November 24, the stock dramatically increased in value from 32 to 35%, following the public
unveiling of a new type of internal combustion engine. Id. Gintel immediately began to sell
Curtiss-Wright stock on the 24th and continued the next morning, selling more than 6,000
shares in the two days. Id. All of these sales were transacted prior to Curtiss-Wright's decision
to lower its dividend. Id.
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upon information he received from an associate who was a director of
Curtiss-Wright. 60 The Commission maintained that Gintel owed a
duty to disclose this information because of "the existence of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to information intended
to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal
benefit of anyone." 6 1 This was a major breakthrough in the expansion of rule 10b-5 because it eliminated the necessity of proving the
common law elements of fraud and deceit, 6 2 and more importantly, it
60

Id. at 909. Upon hearing about the dividend reduction, Gintel executed two sell orders:

one of 2,000 shares and the other, a short sale of 5,000 shares. Id. at 909. The Commissioner
rejected Gintel's argument that these sales were a "continuance of his prior schedule of liquidation," because they were transacted hastily in order to beat the public announcement, in contrast
to his previous moderate rate of sales. Id. at 916.
With regard to the question of whether a "continuance of [a] prior schedule of liquidation,"
can serve as a viable defense for a broker charged with nondisclosure of inside information,
Professor Painter has stated that, so long as the broker is not motivated by the inside information he should not be restricted. Painter, supra note 29, at 1388; see Daub & Phillips, The
Implications of Cady, Roberts, 17 Bus. LAw. 939, 955-56 (1962). But cf. Sandler & Conwill,
Texas Gulf Sulphur: Reform in the Securities Marketplace, 30 OHIo ST. L.J. 225, 269 (1969)
(receipt of inside information by broker should not be utilized to countermand previous contrary
recommendation).
61 40 S.E.C. at 912. A second reason for extending the duty to disclose inside information to
noncorporate insiders was to combat "the inherent unfairness involved where a party takes
advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing." Id.
However, application of the fairness doctrine has rarely been used as the sole basis for placing
restrictions on trading due to the administrative problems involved. Fleischer & Mundheim,
supra note 3, at 331.
62 The common law claims for fraud and deceit were based on an express misrepresentation
of a material fact. 3 L. Loss, supra note 29, at 1432. In a common law action based on mere
nondisclosure, the plaintiff had to show that either a fiduciary relationship existed between the
parties, or that the defendant knew that the plaintiff was acting under a mistaken belief as to a
material fact. Frigitemp Corp. v. Financial Dynamics Fund, Inc., 524 F.2d 275, 283 (2d Cir.
1975); 3 L. Loss, supra note 29, at 1434-35. Thus, under the common law, a corporate insider
could sell stock of his own company based on inside information with relative impunity because
he owed no fiduciary duty to the buyer. See 40 S.E.C. at 913-14. The SEC in Cady, interpreted rule 10b-5 to be broader than the common law, imposing on a corporate insider the
same duty of disclosure when selling as when purchasing securities of his company, thus, negating the relevance of a fiduciary relationship. Id. at 913-14; see Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46,
49 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951).
In the early 1970's, the Supreme Court indicated a willingness to expand rule 10b-5 and
break away from the restrictive common law fraud requirements. Allen, supra note 9, at 119.
See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972), where the Court held
that in nondisclosure cases involving transactions conducted on national exchanges, the old
common law element of reliance need not be proven; and Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers
Life Cas. Co., 400 U.S. 6, 12 (1971), where the Court liberalized the "in connection with"
requirement of rule 10b-5, thereby increasing the class of potential defendants.
Under the current Burger Court, however, a new, more restrictive trend emerged. Allen,
supra note 9, at 119. See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (no private
action under lob-5 unless scienter is alleged); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U.S. 723 (1975) (under rule 10b-5, plaintiff must be purchaser or seller of securities to have
standing).
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extended the classes of people subject to the disclosure rule.6 3 Gintel was not a corporate insider, but was deemed to have the obligations of an insider because of the special relationship which gave him
access to-inside information. 4
The expansion of rule 10b-5 continued in Securities and Exchange Commission v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. 65 In Texas Gulf Sulphur, certain directors and employees of the defendant company had
bought shares of stock in the corporation without disclosing to their
sellers certain material information concerning mineral discoveries
which were highly valuable to the company. 6 6 The court, in finding
these corporate insiders and employees 67 in violation of rule 10b-5
for trading on material nonpublic
information, ostensibly relied on the
"access" aspect of Cady. 6 8 The Second Circuit described the analysis
proffered by Cady as the very essence of rule 10b-5, 69 but apparently
still found it overly restrictive. 70 The court did not find it necessary,

63 40 S.E.C. at 912. The Commission also rejected Cady's assertion that a broker's fiduciary
duty to his discretionary accounts can justify nondisclosure, declaring that "this relationship
could not justify any actions . . . contrary to law." Id. at 916.
64 Id. The Commission did not elaborate as to the nature of this special relationship, but
this test has been used to impose the obligations of a corporate insider on employees who were
not officers or directors, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 858-62 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969), and on family members and friends of insiders, Ross v. Licht,
263 F. Supp. 395, 409-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), when they trade on material nonpublic information.
For other cases involving broker-dealers who effectuated transactions after obtaining inside information, see, e.g., Van Alstyne, Noel & Co., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8511 (Jan.
31, 1969); Blyth & Co., Inc., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8499 (Jan. 17, 1969); Herbert
E. Honohan, 13 S.E.C. 754 (1943).
65 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); see Barnet, supra note 40,
at 284.
66 401 F.2d at 843-48. Texas Gulf Sulphur (TGS) was a corporation engaged in, among other
things, the exploration and mining of certain minerals. Id. at 843. The company had drilled a
test hole in Ontario, Canada which looked to be a very promising source of copper, zinc and
silver. Id. While concealing the magnitude of the find, certain corporate employees purchased
large amounts of TGS stock. Id. at 843-44.
67 Id. at 848.

An earlier state law decision similarly held that lower corporate employees were prohibited
from trading on inside information. Brophy v. Cities Service Co., 31 Del. 241, 244-45, 70 A.2d
5, 7 (Ch. 1949). In a derivative action the president's confidential secretary, who purchased
shares of the corporation with knowledge of its impending market purchases, was found to be in
breach of his duty to the corporation. Id. at 246-47, 70 A.2d at 8.
68 401 F.2d at 848; see Barnet, supra note 40, at 284. Cady specifically referred to some
"relationship" that gave access to inside information. 40 S.E.C. at 912. The Texas Gulf Sulphur
court suggested that "access" alone was enough to trigger the duty of disclosure. 401 F.2d at
848.
69 401 F.2d at 848; Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, supra note 29, at 805.
10 See 401 F.2d at 848; Barnet, supra note 40, at 284.
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in imposing a duty of disclosure, to establish any special relationship
71
with the corporation or someone privy to its confidential matters.
Anyone in possession of material inside information was deemed to
be subject to the rule, and thereby obligated to disclose that information or abstain from trading. 72 Thus, mere possession of material
inside information, without any special relationship, was considered
sufficient to trigger a duty to disclose. 73 This extreme position, based
on equality of information, has not been adopted by the courts, for no
case to date has imposed a duty of disclosure based on mere possession of information without some concomitant relationship to the is74
suer.
While the court in Texas Gulf Sulphur reserved opinion as to the
75
liability of tippees who traded without disclosing inside information,
subsequent decisions have held them in violation of the rule. 76 In
71 See 401 F.2d at 848. The defendants in Texas Gulf Sulphur, however, were corporate
employees and insiders and therefore had a relationship with the corporation which made them
privy to inside information. ld.; see Fleischer supra note 44, at 1282.
72 401 F.2d at 848. By taking this extreme position, the Second Circuit is apparently equating fairness with equal access to material information. 1 A. BROMBERG, supra note 3, at 180
n. 169.2.
73 401 F.2d at 848; Barnet, supra note 40, at 824-25. The court rested its holding on the
conclusion that "the Rule is based in policy on the justifiable expectation of the securities marketplace that all investors . . . have relatively equal access to material information." Id. If equality
of information was the legislative intent behind rule 10b-5, then trading on market information
could be considered within its ambit since it creates an unequal trading situation. If, however,
the purpose of 10b-5 was to prohibit corporate insiders from abusing their positions of trust,
then holding those trading on market information in violation of 10b-5 is an unfounded extension of the rule. See notes 150-56 infra and accompanying text.
74 W. PAINTER, supra note 49, at 41 (1978 Supp.). After taking such an extreme position in
Texas Gulf Sulphur, the Second Circuit in SEC v. Great American Indus., Inc., 407 F.2d 453
(2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 920 (1969), sitting en banc, apparently had misgivings
about imposing an affirmative duty of disclosure when there was no special relationship present.
407 F.2d at 460. Although that particular issue was not presented in the case, a majority of the
court pointed out that: "[t]o read Rule 10b-5 as placing an affirmative duty of disclosure on
persons who in contrast to 'insiders' or broker-dealers did not occupy a special relationship to a
seller or buyer of securities, would be occupying new ground and would require most careful
consideration." Id.; see ALl FED. SECURITIES CODE § 1603, Comment 3(d) at 538 (proposed
official draft 1978). Three concurring judges in Great American, including Judge Kaufman, however, were willing to break this new ground. Id. at 462-66. Judge Kaufman, the author of
Chiarella, stated that the old common law elements of fraud are no longer viable as a definition
of the outer limits of liability under rule 10b-5. Id. at 462.
75 401 F.2d at 852-53. There was evidence proffered that Darke, a geologist employed by
Texas Gulf Sulphur, had tipped news of the resumption of the drilling to outsiders. Id. at 852.
The court withheld judgment as to the liability of these tippees, since they were not defendants
in the instant proceeding. Id. at 852-53. However, the court did note that their conduct was
"equally reprehensible." Id. at 853.
76 See, e.g., Radiation Dynamics, Inc. v. Goldmuntz, 464 F.2d 876, 887, 890 (2d Cir.
1972); Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); In re Investors Management Co.,
[1970-1971 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 78,163. Cf. Kuehnert v. Texstar
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Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. ,'77 the Second
Circuit squarely dealt with the issue of whether tippees were subject
to rule 10b-5 and more specifically whether the disclose or abstain
rule of Texas Gulf Sulphur was applicable to them.7 8 Merrill Lynch,
as a prospective underwriter for a new issue of Douglas Aircraft
Company stock, received nonpublic information from Douglas concerning an unfavorable earnings report. 79 Merrill Lynch leaked this
information to certain favored customers 8 who promptly sold before
the news was publicly announced.8 1 In holding these trading tippees
in violation of rule 10b-5, the court stated that since the "defendants
knew or should have known of the confidential corporate source of
the information and ... knew of its nonpublic nature, they were
under a duty not to trade in Douglas stock without publicly disclosing
82
such information."
Corp., 412 F.2d 700, 702-05 (5th Cir. 1969) (tippee, who received information directly from
president of corporation, considered in pari-delicto with tipper-insider, and hence denied cause
of action against his tipper for fraud under 10b-5).
77 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
78 Id.

at 237-38.

79 Id. at 232. As an underwriter, Merrill Lynch had a duty to investigate and pursue all
material inside information concerning Douglas, and Douglas had a duty to disclose it. See
JENNINGS & MARSH, supra note 33, at 948 n.15. The revised earnings forecast projected a
sharp decrease in earnings for 1966, with a potentially "'no profit" situation accruing, and a
substantially decreased projected earnings for 1967. 495 F.2d at 232. As an insider or tippee,
Merrill Lynch had a duty not to reveal this information. See JENNINGS & MARSH, supra note 33,
at 948 n. 15.
80 495 F.2d at 232. Most of the tippees were institutional investors. Id.
81 Id. In a four day period immediately following the leak of the information concerning the
revised earnings report, the defendant tippees sold more than 165,000 shares of Douglas stock
on the New York Stock Exchange, which was nearly one half of the total shares traded. Id.
Before Douglas issued its press release announcing its unfavorable earnings outlook, the rash of
selling by the defendants caused a dramatic decline in the market price of Douglas's stock. Id.
at 233.
82 Id. at 238 (emphasis added). This language is very similar to that used by the SEC in a
prior administrative hearing, which dealt with the same fact pattern that prompted the Merrill
Lynch proceedings. See In re Investors Management Co. Inc., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 78,163. In holding the defendants in violation of rule 10b-5, the
Commission found tippees subject to the disclosure rule of Texas Gulf Sulphur, but only if
specific elements were present. Id. at
80,514. A tippee who receives material, nonpublic
information and has reason to know that it "emanate[d] from a corporate source . . . acquires a
relationship with respect to that information" which subjects him to the prohibitions of the
securities laws. Id. at 80,520. The commission rejected respondent's contention that a special
relationship must exist between the tippee and the issuing corporation before liability can attach
under rule 10b75. Id. at 80,520. However, since liability was predicated on the inside information emanating from a corporate source, some "relationship" with the issuing company was
still required. See id.
One commentator has defined this as a "modified 'special relationship' test." Barnet, supra
note 40, at 285. This test finds a tippee in violation of rule 10b-5 if he receives "information that
was material and non-public . . . [he] knew or had reason to know if it was non-public and had
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In the evolution of rule 10b-5, the expansion of the duty of disclosure to include those persons other than traditional corporate insiders has been accomplished by basing this special obligation on
some relationship between the trader and the issuing company (corporation whose stock was traded)., 3 There is some degree of doubt,
however, whether this rationale can be utilized to impose this duty
on those who trade solely on market information without any such
relationship.8 4 Since market information generally does not stem
from the issuing corporation, 8 5 there is no relationship with, or in86
formation flowing from the issuer, upon which to predicate liability.
Although the SEC is apparently willing to break new ground and
hold those who trade without disclosing material nonpublic market
information in violation of rule 10b-5,' 7 the courts, generally, have
been obtained improperly by selective revelation or otherwise, and [the] information was [a]
factor in [a] decision to effect transactions." In re Investor's Management Co. Inc., [1970-1971
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,514.
There is still much uncertainty as to whether or not a remote tippee, who has no reason to
know of the source of the information or who receives it from someone who is not a corporate
insider or privy to corporate information, should also be under a duty of disclosure. Compare 1
A. BROMBERG, supra note 3, at 190.19 with W. PAINTER, supra note 49, at 143-44. Professor
Painter makes a distinction between information received by the classical tippee and that of the
"locker room case." W. PAINTER, supra note 49, at 142. He suggests that inside information
overheard in a locker room or restaurant that is used to effect a stock transaction, is already in
the "public domain," which negates the necessity for disclosure. Id. In the tippee situition,
knowledge of the corporate source of the information and potential breach of fiduciary duty by
the tippor, create special obligations. Id. However, Professor Painter would limit the scope of
this doctrine to only first level tippees. Id. at 144.
83 W. PAINTER, supra note 49, at 137; see 588 F.2d at 1373 (Meskill, J., dissenting). When
the requisite relationship has not been found, liability under rule 10b-5 has not been imposed.
See, e.g., General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., Inc., 403 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 1026 (1969); Mills v. Sarjem Corp., 133 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1955). In Mills, the
members of a syndicate, who had no previous connection with the corporation, were held not to
have violated section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 when they offered to purchase the shares of stock
held by plaintiff shareholders. Id. at 764. At the time of the offer, the syndicate had plans to
sell the valuable property of the company upon assuming control of the corporation, thereby
reaping tremendous profits for its members. Id. at 759. The court held that, at the time the
offers were made, none of the defendants occupied an inside position which would create any
fiduciary duty of disclosure on his part. Id. at 764-65.
84 Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, supra note 29, at 819. The authors suggest that a
president of an acquiring corporation, who privately buys shares in the target company, owes no
duty to the target sellers under rule 10b-5 to disclose the news of the tender offer because no
relationship exists to trigger liability. Id. at 815.
85

See note 33 supra.

86 See id.

87 See SEC v. Cambell [1972 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
93,580 (C.D.
Cal. July 24, 1972); cf. In re Blythe & Co., Inc. [1968-1969 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 9 77,647. Blythe received his market information from the issuer, an employee
of the Federal Reserve Bank. Id.at 1 83,398. He was found to have violated section 10(b) and
rule 10b-5 by trading in government securities while in possession of material nonpublic information concerning the terms of a new government issuance. Id.
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not been so inclined.8 8 The Supreme Court, however, in Affiliated
Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States,8 9 suggested that the analysis
used to justify trading restrictions based on the special relationship
test can be extended to those who have a relationship with the functioning of the market. 90
88 See JENNINGS & MARSH, supra note 33, at 952-53; W. PAINTER, supra note 49, at 135.
The Ninth Circuit, however, recently held a financial columnist (Cambell) in violation of section
10(b) and rule 10b-5 for purchasing shares of a company, American Systems, Inc. (ASI), prior to
the appearance of his column in which he gave the company a strong "buy" recommendation.
Zweig v, Hearst Corp., 594 F.2d 1261, 1266-67 (9th Cir. 1979). Although the plaintiffs were
nonreaders of Cambell's column, the court went to great lengths to first establish Cambell's
liability for failure to disclose to his readers the position he took in the stock of ASI and the
personal gain he would realize if they followed his advice. Id. at 1266. Cambell was found to
owe a duty of disclosure because "with knowledge of the stock's market and an intent to gain
personally, he encouraged purchases of the securities in the market." Id. at 1267.
Cambell was not a traditional corporate insider, or a tippee, but was still found to owe his
readers a duty of disclosure. See id. at 1266-67. The information that he failed to reveal was not
the type that affected the company's net worth, or relevant to its earnings potential. Id. at 1266.
Thus, Cambell was characterized as a "quasi-insider" because of his position outside the company in which he traded, while privy to information which would affect the market price of the
corporation's stock. Id. at 1267 n.9.
The actual plaintiffs were majority shareholders of Reading Guidance Center, Inc. (RGC), a
company that was contractually bound to sell its assets to ASI for $1,800,000 worth of ASI stock.
Id. at 1263, 1269. In order for the plaintiffs to recover, the court stated that it had to be shown
"that they were in a relationship with Cambell similar to his readers' relationship with him." Id.
at 1269. The court noted that RGC and the readers had "similar stakes in the processes of the
market" and stated that Cambell was capable of obtaining knowledge of RGC's contract with
ASI. Id. "RGC relied on the existences of an honest market," but because of the quick rise in
the market price of ASI shares initiated by Cambell's article, they were forced to sell in a
manipulated market and received fewer ASI shares than it anticipated. Id. Due to the manipulative effect Cambell's activities had on the market price of ASI, the court held that RGC
was a foreseeable plaintiff and that the requisite relationship existed in order to impose on
Cambell a duty to RGC. Id.
Although broadly read, this case could be interpreted to hold that trading on market information is in violation of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, a closer analysis indicates that liability was
predicated on a relationship between the parties. See id. at 1269. In this light it is easily
distinguishable from Chiarella. Chiarella had no relationship with and owed no duty to the
target sellers. His liability was based upon some general duty to the marketplace. Hence, Zweig
v. Hearst should not be read as a new trend in the expansion of rule 10b-5, but rather as
another conflict of interest case. See id. at 1268. The court relied on Chasins v. Smith Barney &
Co., 438 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1970), and Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406
U.S. 128 (1972), two cases in which a specific relationship between the parties created the
conflict of interest and the concomitant duty to disclose.
It can be argued that although Chiarella had no relationship with the target sellers, he did
possess an agency relationship with the acquiring corporations which he breached by purchasing
the target cornpany shares. Indeed, this breach of fiduciary duty was one of the dual grounds
cited by the district court in finding Chiarella liable under rule 10b-5. United States v.
Chiarella, 450 F. Supp. 95, 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). The Second Circuit, in dictum, upheld the
district court's treatment of this issue. 588 F.2d at 1368 n. 14. For a discussion of the agency
theory of liability, see note 125 infra.
89 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
90 See 406 U.S. at 152-53; Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, supra note 29, at 819.
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Affiliated Ute involved a bank which agreed to act as transfer
agent for the Ute Development Corporation (UDC). 9 ' UDC was
formed in response to the Ute Partition Act of 1954,92 which provided for partition and distribution of the Ute Indians' assets to
mixed-blood and full-blood tribe members. 93 UDC represented the
mixed bloods and facilitated the distribution of the assets to them. 94
Each of the 490 mixed-bloods received ten shares of UDC stock. 95
Two bank employees, Gale and Haslem, went beyond their roles as
transfer agents and bought shares of UDC from the Indians for their
own account. 9 6 Without informing the Indians, they resold these
shares in a secondary market at a substantially higher price. 9 7 The
Court held that, under rule 10b-5, Gale and Haslem owed a duty to
the Indians to disclose the different price at which the shares were
trading in the secondary market, and also to disclose their marketmaker 98 status. 99
Although Gale and Haslem were not traditional corporate insiders, tippees, or broker-dealers, 10 0 they were found to have a duty of
91 406 U.S. at 136.

92 25 U.S.C. §§ 677-677aa (1954).
93 406 U.S. at 133-34. The tribe had over twenty million dollars in cash, land and accounts
receivable derived primarily from a judgment against the United States. id. at 134 n.4. In
addition, it possessed many valuable material resources and unresolved claims against the
United States. Id. at 134.
9" Id. at 136. To avoid the possible loss of the stock certificates, UDC decided not to deliver
them to the mixed-bloods but rather to deposit them at the bank, whereupon receipts were
issued to the shareholders. Id. at 136--37. The stock was not freely transferable since a mixedblood shareholder had to first offer the stock to other tribal members before he could look to
outside purchasers. Id. at 137. Only if the offer was not accepted by any tribal member could
the shareholder sell to an outsider, and only at a price at least as high as that offered to
members. Id. These restrictions on transfer were stamped on the face of the stock certificate.
Id.
95 Id. at 136.
96 Id. at 146-47. They purchased 113 shares themselves, and facilitated the direct transfer of
additional shares from mixed-bloods to non-Indians. Id. at 147.
97 Id.
98 A market-maker has been defined by the SEC as
[A] dealer who, with respect to a particular security, holds himself out (by entering indications of interest in purchasing and selling in an inter-dealer quotations
system or otherwise) as being willing to buy and sell for his own account on a
continuous basis otherwise than on a national securities exchange.
SEC Rule 17A-9(f)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-9(f)(1977).
99 406 U.S. at 151-53. The bank agreed to act on the Indians' behalf, consequently, the
Indians relied on this relationship when they sold their shares. Id. at 151. By creating the
secondary market and devising a plan which induced the Indians to sell their shares, the nondisclosure constituted a "' device, scheme, or artifice"' to defraud, which 10b-5 specifically prohibited. Id. at 153; see 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a)(1977).
10 A broker-dealer generally holds himself out as a securities expert and, as a result, customers place reliance on his expertise. See R. FROME & V. ROSENZWERG, SALES OF SECURITIES BY CORPORATE INSIDERS 176 (1975). The relationship between broker-dealer and cus-
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disclosure.' 0 ' Thus, there is the suggestion that trading on market
information could trigger the disclosure rule. 10 2 However, the Court
specifically stated "that if the two men and the employer bank, had
functioned merely as a transfer agent, there would have been no duty
of disclosure," 103 indicating that it was some other factor besides the
regular access to market information that was the triggering
mechanism. 104
The court, in Chiarella, interpreted Affiliated Ute to hold that
regular access to market information by itself imposes a duty of disclosure. 10 5 Using Ute as precedent, they formulated their new test:
"Anyone-corporate insider or not-who regularly receives material
non-public information may not use that information to trade in securities without incurring an affirmative duty to disclose." 106
Judge Kaufman, speaking for the court, began his analysis by
rejecting Chiarella's claim that, since he was not an insider of the
target corporation, he was outside the disclose or abstain rule of
tomer is a fiduciary one, necessitating that the broker fully disclose all pertinent data regarding
his customers' transactions. See Wohl v. Blair & Co., 50 F.R.D. 89, 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). Thus,
broker-dealers are also subject to the disclosure rule although not considered traditional corporate insiders. See id.at 91. However, there is a separate section of the federal securities laws
which regulates the conduct of broker-dealers. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, § 15(C)(1),
15 U.S.C. § 7 80(c)(1). Although the activities of Gale and Haslem resembled those of brokerdealers', liability was not based on any broker-dealer relationship but rather upon rule 10b-5.
406 U.S. at 154 n.16.
101 406 U.S. at 151-53.
102 See id; Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, supra note 29, at 819. The SEC sanctioned a
financial newspaper columnist for purchasing shares in corporations prior to the publication of
his articles which gave favorable reports about the corporations. SEC v. Cambell, (1972 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) at 93,580. The Ninth Circuit in Zweig v. Hearst, 594
F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1979) recently found the same newspaper columnist in violation of section
10(b) and rule lOb-5 for not disclosing material nonpublic market information at his disposal. Id.
at 1266-67. However, trading on market information was not the triggering mechanism; liability
was based on a relationship between the parties. See note 88 supra.
s03406 U.S. at 152. The court outlined four reasons why the defendants were not mere
transfer agents: (1) Gale and Haslem were acting as market-makers; (2) they received commissions and other remuneration from the non-Indian buyers; (3) they created and were well aware
of the secondary market for the shares; and (4) "[the bank itself had acknowledged ... that 'it
would be [its] duty to see that these transfers were properly made' and that . . . 'the bank
would be acting for the individual stockholders."' Id.
104 Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, supra note 29, at 819-20; see 406 U.S. at 152-53. The
defendants' activities constituted a "'device, scheme, or artifice"' to defraud the Indian sellers.
Id. at 153. Hence, it was not the mere nondisclosure of market information that was deemed
fraudulent. See id. The bank owed the Indians a duty to disclose all information concerning
their shares because of the relationship and concomitant reliance the Indians placed in the
defendants and also because of the market-maker status that accrued to the bank. See id.at
151-53.
105 588 F.2d at 1366.
106 Id. at 1365.
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Texas Gulf Sulphur.'0 7 Chiarella was designated as a market insider,
who, because of his strategic position within the marketplace, had
regular access to confidential information. 10 8 As such, rule 10b-5 imposed a duty of disclosure on him, since the rule was adopted in
order to create a marketplace where " 'all investors . .. have relatively equal access to material information."' 109 The Chiarella court
concluded that the purpose of rule 10b-5 was "to 'protect the integrity of the market place,' "110 rather than the more specific policy of
thwarting corporate insiders from abusing their positions of trust."'
In order to support its new position, the court relied on the
American Law Institute's Federal Securities Code, section 1602
which is a recodification of rule 10b-5.11 2 The Code suggests a new
category of "quasi-insider" 113 which, in effect, is tantamount to the
market-insider concept. 1 14 In refusing to include quasi-insiders in
the same section of the Code, 1 15 and under the same prohibitions
107 Id. at 1364. Chiarella contended that since he did not owe a fiduciary duty to target
shareholders, he owed them no duty to disclose the news of the tender offer. Id.
508

588 F.2d at 1365.

109Id. at 1365 (quoting Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 828-29 (D. Del.
1951)). Judge Kaufman cited Judge Leahy's much quoted passage in Speed, in order to support
his belief that rule 10b-5 was adopted as a manifesto for equalization of information. See 588
F.2d at 1365. Other courts that have cited Speed for the same proposition are Kohler v. Kohler
Co., 319 F.2d 634, 638 (7th Cir. 1963); List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 906, 911
(S.D.N.Y. 1964), aff'd, 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965). However,
Judge Leahy offered no support for his conclusion that equalization of bargaining position was the
overall objective of rule 10b-5. Moreover, no support can be found in the legislative history
preceding the passage of the 1934 Act. I A. BROMBERG, supra note 3, 66-66.1.
110 588 F.2d at 1365 (quoting United States v. Brown, 555 F.2d 336, 339 (2d Cir. 1977)).
Judge Mulligan, speaking for the circuit court in Brown, cited no support for his conclusion; he
merely stated that "there is no doubt" of Congress's intent. 555 F.2d at 339.
111 588 F.2d at 1365.

112 Id. at 1365-66; Section 1602 reads in pertinent part

(a) It is unlawful for any person to engage in a fraudulent act or to make a misrepresentation in connection with (1) a sale or purchase of a security, an offer to sell or
buy a security, or an inducement not to buy or sell a security.
ALl FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 1602 at 523-24 (Proposed Official Draft 1978).
113 Examples of quasi-insiders would include judges' clerks, who trade with knowledge de-

rived from an opinion to be published, and Federal Reserve Bank employees who trade on
undisclosed information concerning changes in the margin rate. ALl FEDERAL SECURITIES

CODE at 538; c.f. United States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955
(an agreement to secure advance information from the SEC).
114 588 F.2d at 1365.
115Section 1603 states in pertinent part that an
Insider means (1) the issuer, (2) a director or officer of, or a person controlling,
controlled by, or under common control with, the issuer, (3) a person whose relationship or former relationship to the issuer gives or gave him access to a fact of
special significance about the issuer or the security that is not generally available.
ALl FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE at 528-29. The Code also includes tippees in the insider

category. Id.
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(disclose or abstain) as traditional insiders, the drafters indicated that
only "egregious" cases of quasi-insider trading, while silent, would be
violative of the general anti-fraud provision of section 1602. 11 Judge
Kaufman felt that Chiarella's actions were a prime example of such
egregious conduct. 117
The court recognized that not everybody is prohibited from trading on material nonpublic market information.118 It was noted that
the General Time doctrine, permits an acquiring company to purchase up to five percent of the target shares without disclosing the
prospective takeover to the target sellers. 11 9 Nonetheless, the court
rejected Chiarella's contention that, since he received his information
from the offerors, he too could trade. 120 Chiarella and the offerors
were found to occupy completely different positions with respect to
trading on the news of the forthcoming tender offer. 121 Chiarella was
denied the benefit of the General Time doctrine because he had
taken no economic risk, 1 22 had demonstrated no legitimate business

116 Id. at 539. Section 1602(a)(1) prohibits all traud in connection with a purchase or sale o a
security. See id. at 523-24. Thus, a quasi-insider, although not subject to the disclosure rule
based on his insider status (§1603b omits quasi-insiders from its definition of insiders), could
violate the general anti-fraud provision of 1602(a)(1) if his conduct is sufficiently "egregious." Id.
at 539.
117 588 F.2d at 1366.
118 Id.

'19 See id. at 1366.
In General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., Inc., 403 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 1026 (1969), the court found that the defendant Talley did not violate rule 10b-5 by
purchasing shares of General Time without disclosing to the sellers its plans for a merger. Id. at
164. Although the terms of the merger would have been more lucrative to the sellers than the
current market price, the court held:
[W]e know of no rule of law, applicable at the time, that a purchaser of stock, who
was not an 'insider' and had no fiduciary relation to a prospective seller, had any
obligation to reveal circumstances that might raise a seller's demands and thus abort
the sale.
Id.
120 588 F.2d at 1366. The court distinguished Chiarella's role as a market insider from that of
an offeror. Id. An offeror does not regularly receive market information, and hence, is not a
market insider. Id. The only information an offeror receives concerns its own tender offer which
is self-generated. Id.
121 Id.

122 By making the tender offer at a premium above the current market price, the offeror was
willing to place a great deal of money behind its judgment that the target was undervalued. Id.
at 1366-67. Although knowing its preoffer purchases would appreciate, there was no guaranty
that the venture would be profitable, for when the price increased the offeror would be buying
rather than selling. Id. at 1367. On the other hand, Chiarella took virtually no economic risk.
Id. See A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967). The court rejected Chiarella's
contention that he bore the risk of a possible collapse of the tender offer between the time of
his purchases and the time the offer was to be publicly announced. 588 F.2d at 1367 n.12.
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purpose, 12 3 and his purchases were not the result of a bona fide
analysis that the price of the target was undervalued.' 2 4 Although
.both Chiarella and Pandick's clients knew the price of the target
would jump dramatically when the tender offer was announced,
Chiarella would be selling and reaping a virtual no risk short-term
profit, while Pandick's clients would be buying in the hope that their
12 5
pre-offer market analysis proved correct.
The court's holding, although viscerally satisfying considering
Chiarella's dubious conduct, cannot be justified under the present
state of the law.12 6 There is no doubt that Chiarella had an informaJudge Kaufman recognized that business purpose alone could no longer be determinative
of liability under rule 10b-5. 588 F.2d at 1368 n.15; Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S.
462, 474-77 (1977). Chiarella's liability for defrauding the sellers was based on his position as a
market insider, and his concomitant duty to disclose or abstain from trading if he possessed any
material nonpublic market information. 588 F.2d at 1368 n. 15. The economic and business analysis
was examined in order to distinguish Chiarella from the offerors and show why Chiarella could not
claim the benefit of the General Time doctrine. Id.
124 588 F.2d at 1366-68 & n. 15. The preoffer purchases by the acquiring company were the
result of shrewd economic and market analysis. See id.at 1367. The court felt this course of action
should be encouraged rather than prohibited based on the legislative history of the 1934 Act. Id.
See H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1934); S. REp. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.,
81 (1934).
125 588 F.2d at 1367.
In further explaining why Chiarella could not trade while the offerors could, the court
relied on Chiarella's agency status. 588 F.2d at 1367--68. As their agent, Chiarella owed them a
duty not to convert confidential information to his own use. Id. at 1368 n.14. By trading on this
information he created an artificial demand for target company stock, thereby exerting an upward pressure on the price, making his principal's purchases potentially more costly. Id. at
1368.
In this vein it was suggested in dicta that when an agent converts confidential information
to his own use in connection with the purchase or sale of securities it -isa violation of rule
10b-5. Id. at 1368 n. 14. This theory of liability, although buried in a footnote, is perhaps a more
viable approach than the court's primary ground, based on regular access to market information.
Although Chiarella's insignificant purchases probably had little or no effect on the market price
of the stocks he bought, theoretically large enough purchases could exert an undue influence on
the price of any security.
As Judge Meskill noted in his dissent, however, it is not clear that a mere breach of
fiduciary duty is actionable fraud under rule 10b-5. "[T]he term 'fraud' in Rule 10b-5 does not
bring within the ambit of the rule 'all breaches of fiduciary duty in connection with a securities
transaction."' 588 F.2d at 1375 (Meskill, J., dissenting) (quoting Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v.
Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472 (1977)).
The extent to which rule 10b-5 embraces violations of fiduciary duty in securities transactions was not analyzed by the Chiarella court. Instead it was summarily concluded that "violation of an agent's duty to respect client confidences . . . transgresses Rule 10b-5 where, as here,
the converted information both concerned securities and was used to purchase and sell securities." 588 F.2d at 1368 n.14. Considering the Supreme Court's recent policy of strictly
interpreting rule 10b-5, it is not so clear that Chiarella's conduct would be considered within its
ambit.
126 588 F.2d at 1373 (Meskill, J., dissenting). Violations of rule 10b-5, based on nondisclosure, have traditionally been predicated upon some relationship with the issuing corporation.
123
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tional advantage in his transactions with the target sellers. The question remains whether this imbalance translates into a violation of rule
10b-5.
Rule 10b-5 was designed as a "'catch-all"' provision to prohibit
127
all fraud in connection with the purchase and sale of securities.
Mere silence, however, is not prohibited. 128 Only when one has a
duty to speak does silence become fraudulent.129 Traditionally, the
courts have found nondisclosure to be fraudulent only when the defendant had some relationship with either the issuing corporation or
the other party in the transaction.' 3 0 The only significant departure
from the relationship standard was Texas Gulf Sulphur ll which
suggested in broad terms that mere possession of material inside information was enough to trigger the disclosure rule.1 32 However, all
Id.;

Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, supra note 29, at 804. This special relationship test was
first enunciated in In re Cady, Roberts & Co., see notes 58-65 and accompanying text, and has
today become "firmly entrenched" in the analytic framework of all 10b-5 cases based on nondisclosure. 588 F.2d at 1373 (Meskill, J., dissenting). Moreover, the court has failed to cite any
cases in which "liability for nondisclosure has been imposed under section 10(b) on anyone
other than an insider, the tippee of an insider, or one standing in a special relationship with
other traders." Id.
127 Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 801 (5th Cir. 1970).
128 588 F.2d at 1374-75 (Meskill, J., dissenting); see note 20, supra for a reproduction of the
rule.
129 588 F.2d at 1375 (Meskill, J., dissenting); see W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF
TORTS

§ 106 (4th ed. 1971); 3 L. Loss, supra note 29, at chapter 9C.

130 See 588 F.2d at 1373 (Meskill, J., dissenting); Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, supra

note 29, at 804. At common law only those with fiduciary responsibilities had the duty to
disclose material, nonpublic information. Id. Where no fiduciary relationship existed, mere
nondisclosure did not constitute fraud. Jennings, supra note 45, at 810. Although the necessity
of finding a fiduciary duty before imposing liability for nondisclosure gradually eroded, id. at
811, the courts did not impose the disclosure rule in arms length transactions. See id. at 815.
By 1934, the year the Securities Exchange Act was adopted, there was much confusion and
a great concern over the laxity of standards regarding insider trading. Id. at 812. "One of the
primary purposes of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 .. . was to outlaw the use of inside
information by corporate officers and principal stockholders for their own financial advantage to
the detriment of uninformed public security holders." Speed v. Transamerica, 99 F. Supp. 808,
829 (D. Del. 1951). In In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. at 912, the Securities and Exchange Commission formulated the "access" doctrine which has "served as a model for judicial
and administrative opinions ... for more than a decade." Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy,
supra note 29, at 805. In Cady, the obligation to disclose material nonpublic information was
based on some "relationship" with the issuing corporation. Since Cady, courts have categorically
refused to place an affirmative duty of disclosure on outsiders (other than broker-dealers). See,
e.g., SEC v. Great American Indus., Inc., 407 F.2d 453, 460 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 920 (1969); General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., Inc., 403 F.2d 159, 164 (2d
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969).
131401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
132 See id. at 848; Barnet, supra note 40, at 284. If section 10(b) is interpreted to restrict any
person with material nonpublic information from trading based on that information, it renders
section 16(b) superfluous. See Painter, supra note 29, at 1380 n.68. "[T]here is no evidence that
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of the defendants in Texas Gulf Sulphur were, in fact, insiders or
employees with the requisite relationship to the issuing corporation. 133 No subsequent case has adopted this mere possession standard. 134 Moreover, the Second Circuit sitting en banc in SEC v.
Great American Industries, Inc., 13 apparently retreated from its extreme position in Texas Gulf Sulphur.136 In Great American Industries, the court stated in dictum that to find outsiders, with no relationship to those with whom they trade, in violation of rule 10b-5 for
failure to disclose "would be occupying new ground and would require most careful consideration." 137 Hence, the finding that
Chiarella, who had no relationship with the target company and no
fiduciary duty to his sellers, was obligated to disclose nonpublic market information is indeed breaking new ground.
The court felt that holding Chiarella subject to the disclosure
rule was not breaking new ground because Affiliated Ute had established the principle that "[a] duty to disclose [arose] out of regular
access to market information .... "13
However, a close examination of Affiliated Ute indicates that liability was not predicated on

section 10(b) was thought of at the time of enactment as a 'backstop' for transactions which
happened to slip through the narrow net of section 16(b).'" Id. Although there is language in the
Texas Gulf Sulphur opinion which suggests that "anyone" with mere possession of inside information must disclose or abstain, 401 F.2d at 848, the subsequent cases have not adopted this
loose interpretation, and have limited the imposition of liability to insiders, and those with a
special relationship to either the issuing corporation or other traders. 588 F.2d at 1373 (Meskill,
J., dissenting).
133 The defendants included a geologist, an electrical engineer, an accountant, and other
various employees and officers of Texas Gulf Sulphur. 401 F.2d at 845: Barnet, supra note 40,
at 284.
134 See 588 F.2d at 1373 (Meskill, J., dissenting); W. PAINTER, supra note 49, at 41 (1978
Cum. Supp.).
135407 F.2d 453, 460 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 920 (1969).
13

See id. at 460.

137Id. Great American Industries involved an action by the SEC for an injunction against
sellers of mining property, who did not disclose certain finders fees to the buyer. Id. at 455.
Since the case involved much more than mere nondisclosure, the court did not find it necessary
to directly address the question of whether or not the seller had an affirmative duty of disclosure. Id. at 461. Judge Kaufman, in a concurring opinion, suggested that the Cady analysis was
too restrictive. Id. at 462-63 (Kaufman, J., concurring). He stated that, at least for the purpose
of granting injunctive relief, "any claim that material facts were withheld in a transaction in
connection with the sale or purchase of securities must be scrutinized with care, whether or not
there would have been liability at common law for such a deed." Id. at 463 (Kaufman, J.,
concurring).
138 588 F.2d at 1366. The Chiarella court interpreted Affiliated Ute to hold that Gale and
Haslem's "position at the center of the two markets" triggered the disclosure rule. 588 F.2d at
1366. Even assuming that this interpretation is correct, there is no evidence in Affiliated Ute
that the court intended to create a duty of disclosure based solely on regular access to market
information. See notes 89-104 supra and accompanying text.
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regular access to market information, but rather on a special relationship that existed between the defendants and the Indians.1 39 The
bank specifically undertook to act on behalf of the Ute shareholders
and to properly handle all transfers of their stock. 140 This relationship of trust and reliance, not the regular access to market informa14 1
tion, created the duty.
In attempting to buttress its new test of regular access to market
information, the court relied on the American Law Institute's Federal
Securities Code 142 concept of "quasi-insider." 143 The Code, however, does not impose the same affirmative duty of disclosure on the
quasi-insider as it imposes on traditional insiders. 14 4 The Reporter's
comments section states that "it is hard to find justification today for
imposing a fiduciary's duty of affirmative disclosure on an outsider
who is not a 'tippee.'" 145 It further recognized that, although it
would be convenient to have this new category of quasi-insider, the
inherent difficulties in such an extension would outweigh its "convenience." 146
The majority also sidestepped General Time, in which the Second Circuit had previously held that possession of market information
by an outsider was insufficient to create a duty of disclosure.1 47 Instead of overruling General Time, Judge Kaufman distinguished
Chiarella, judicially creating the market insider whose mere location
within the marketplace was enough to trigger the disclose or abstain
rule of Texas Gulf Sulphur.148 By imposing the same fiduciary duty

139 588 F.2d at 1375 (Meskill, J., dissenting); Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. at 152. The Indian
sellers "'considered these defendants to be familiar with the market for the shares of stock and
relied upon them when they desired to sell their shares.'" 406 U.S. at 152. By developing and
encouraging a secondary market for the Ute shares, the defendants (Gale and Haslem) went
beyond their designated role as transfer agents. See id.
In light of the defendants' relationship with the Indians, these activities created an affirmative duty to disclose. 588 F.2d at 1375 (Meskill, J., dissenting); see 406 U.S. at 152.
140 406 U.S. at 152.
141 Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, supra note 29, at 820.
142 See note 112 supra.
143 588 F.2d at 1365.
144 ALl FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE, § 1603, comment 3(d) at 538-39.
145 Id. at 538. "[N]ot every case of an outsider's trading without disclosure of a material fact
is a 'fraudulent act.' Section 1603 reflects no universally acceptable theory of 'market
egalitarianism."' Id. at 539.
146 id. at 538-39.
147 403 F.2d at 164; see note 119 supra. See also Jennings, supra note 45, at 815; 1 A.
BROMBERG, supra note 3, at 122.7" n.37.3.
148 588 F.2d at 1364, 1365. Judge Kaufman emphasized the strategic and sensitive position of
the financial printer; by necessity, they are privy to the most "confidential information in the
world of finance," and hence should not be able to gain personally from their position. Id. at
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on market insiders as is imposed on traditional corporate insiders, the
court dramatically extended section 10(b) without a "clear indication
in prior law that this is the next logical step .. . [in its] judicial
development." 149
In order to determine if the disclosure requirements of rule
10b-5 can be expanded to include market insiders, a preliminary inquiry should have been made into whether the rule was in fact
adopted to promote equality of information or whether it was designed to curb the manipulative abuses of corporate insiders. An underlying assumption running throughout the court's opinion was that
rule 10b-5 " 'is based .. . on the justifiable expectation .. . that all
investors . . . have relatively equal access to material information."' 150 Since under traditional analysis, Chiarella owed no duty of
disclosure to the target sellers, 15 1 his liability had to be predicated on
some general duty to the market. Only if equalization of information
was the legislative purpose behind rule 10b-5, could a general duty to
152
the market exist.
The majority opinion gave little support for its "equal access"
theory. Equalization of bargaining positions is no doubt a laudable
objective, but no such intention is "conspicuous" in the legislative
and administrative hearings accompanying the passage of rule 10b5.153 Although the legislative hearings are somewhat inconclusive,
they do seem to indicate that the primary purpose of the rule was to
curb the manipulative practices of corporate insiders.15 4 The Second

1365. There is no doubt that Judge Kaufman accurately portrayed the nature and the role of the
financial printer. Due to their position, printers must constantly receive and disseminate volatile
and valuable information. However, one must question whether the mere importance of their
position mandates the awkward use of rule. 10b-5.
Broker-dealers, floor traders, specialist traders, and other market professionals are similarly
privy to very sensitive and confidential information. Their activities are regulated and
scrutinized by the SEC and other self-regulatory agencies. The SEC has specific power under
section 11(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78 k(b) (1970), to draft rules imposing
special sanctions on specialist activities, and under section 11(a), to regulate floor trading by
security exchange members for their own or discretionary accounts. Rule 10b-5 has not been
applied to prevent these market professionals from abusing their positions because it clearly
was not designed for such a purpose. See Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, supra note 29, at
847.
149 588 F.2d at 1373 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
150 See id. at 1365 (quoting SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969)).
151 See notes 40-90 supra and accompanying text.
152 See Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, supra note 29, at 830.
153 1 A. BROMBERG, supra note 3, at 66-66.1.
I'
Id. The following passage illustrates the abuses prevalent in the 1920s which led to the
passage of the 1934 Act.
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Circuit, as recently as 1972, found that "[t]he essential purpose of
rule 10b-5 . . . is to prevent corporate insiders and their tippees
from taking unfair advantage of the uninformed outsiders." 155 The
Cady analysis and nearly every subsequent case based an affirmative
duty of disclosure on some special relationship with the issuing corporation, rather than on mere possession of material inside information. 15 6 If equalization of information was the legislative intent, why
have the courts adhered to the Cady analysis in order to find liability
based on rule 1Ob-5?
Even if we assume, arguendo, that the Second Circuit was on
solid ground in finding that the legislative purpose of rule 10b-5 was
to foster equal access to information, the decision, although more
palatable, still cannot be justified. If equal access or parity of information was the true legislative intent, then "anyone" with material inside information should be subject to the disclosure rule. The court,
however, found it necessary to qualify its holding by imposing a duty
only upon those people with "regular" access to market information. 157
This qualification was perhaps motivated by the court's concern
for small investors who do not participate in the stock market with
the notion that they can outthink the market professionals. A small
investor generally receives a tip (often market information) and trades
because he believes he has an advantage. If the purpose of the 1934
Act was equal access, the small investor should be required to disclose his tip. It is doubtful that the drafters intended such a result.
Hence, the Chiarella court's new test includes "regular" access,
which softens the impact of the holding somewhat, allowing the small
investor to trade on his tip since he does not regularly receive such
information. If "regular" had been omitted, it could have had an unsettling effect on the stock market, since some investors might have
become apprehensive about trading due to the possibility of criminal

Among the most vicious practices unearthed at the hearings before the subcommittee was the flagrant betrayal of their fiduciary duties by directors and officers of
corporations who used their positions of trust and the confidential information which
came to them in such positions, to aid them in their market activities. Closely allied
to this type of abuse was the unscrupulous employment of inside information by
large stockholders who, while not directors and officers, exercised sufficient control
over the destinies of their companies to enable them to acquire and profit by information not available to others.
S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1934).
1'5 Radiation Dynamics, Inc. v. Goldmuntz, 464 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1972).
156See notes 41-90 supra and accompanying text.
157 588 F.2d at 1365.

NOTES

19801

liability. The insertion of "regular", which appeases the marketplace,
in effect, distorts the court's analysis.
The "regular access" test presents additional problems by apparently allowing the president of an acquiring company to purchase
shares in a target company for his own account without incurring a
duty of disclosure under rule 10b-5. Unlike Chiarella, a corporate
president generally does not have regular access to market information, since corporate takeovers are not a common occurrence, and
would not be obligated to the target sellers to disclose his inside
knowledge of the impending tender offer. Hence, under the court's
new test, the president of an acquiring corporation may escape rule
10b-5 liability although State law continues to impose a fiduciary obligation on insiders not to exploit information acquired by virtue of
their position. 158
This paradox exemplifies the problem in using rule 10b-5 to find
a duty of disclosure in cases involving market information. 15 9 Although Chiarella's actions should not be condoned, rule 10b-5 should
not be the vehicle by which liability is imposed. 160 "In the absence
of any viable precedent upon which to base [this] totally new concept
. . . my brothers . .. announce an extraordinary, expansive, and
incorrect reading of . . . [the] law solely because of their urge to
'provid[e] a disincentive to insider trading.'"161 Ironically, these
words are not from Judge Meskill's dissent in Chiarella, but rather
from Judge Kaufman's dissent in Schein v. Chasen. They represent
his awareness that "hard facts make bad law," and that "judges are
not free agents roaming at will to create law to fit the facts." 162 In
'5s Hence, any profits made would have to be returned to the corporation. See, e.g., Brophy
v. Cities Service Co., 31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5 (1949); Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d
494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969).
159 Under thisnew test it would appear that stock warehousers would violate rule 10b-5 by
purchasing target shares without disclosing the impending tender offer (market information) to
the target sellers. See Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, supra note 29, at814. Warehousing is
a process by which acquiring companies finance takeovers by informing institutional investors of
the forthcoming acquisition. Id. at 812. For a detailed discussion of warehousing, see Thomas,
Warehousing, 3 REV. SEC. REG. 975 (1970), While the SEC's Institutional Investor Study Report, H.R. Doc. No. 92-64, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), concluded that the leaking of nonpublic information to institutional investors and their subsequent purchase of the acquiring company's shares may be a violation of rule 10b-5, any suggestion that the purchase of the target
company's shares was in violation of rule 10b-5 was conspicuously absent. Fleischer, Mundheim
& Murphy, supra note 29, at 812. "Such purchases would not violate rule 10b-5 under the
Cady, Roberts analysis because the information isreceived from the acquiring company and the
stock traded is that of the Target Company." Id. at 812-13.
160 588 F.2d at 1376 (Meskill, J.,dissenting).
161 Schein v. Chasen, 478 F.2d 817, 825 (2d Cir. 1973) (Kaufman, J., dissenting).
162

Id.
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Chiarella, however, Judge Kaufman neglected to heed his own warnings and succumbed to the temptations that hard facts present.
This holding illustrates the difficulty of attempting to use rule
10b-5 to restrict the exploitation of market information. The rule is
not as broad and far-reaching as the court found. It was -not intended
to cover every abuse or unfairness that is related to the securities industry. The SEC has been successful in controlling and
monitoring the activities of market professionals via rulemaking, and a
similar approach should be adopted to prevent financial printers and
others with "regular access" to market information from abusing their
positions.

Author's Note:
The United States Supreme Court, in Chiarella v. United States,
No. 78-1202 (Sup. Ct. Mar. 18, 1980), reversed the Second Circuit,
ruling that mere possession of material nonpublic market information
does not create a duty to disclose under section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. Slip. op. at 8-10. Relying on an interpretation
of the Act essentially identical to that discussed above, the Court rejected the notion that Mr. Chiarella owed a general duty to the marketplace, noting that there is no legislative history to support such a
theory. Id. at 10. In orderfor silence to be actionable as fraud under
section 10(b), it must be based on "a duty to disclose arisingfrom a
relationshipof trust and confidence between parties to a transaction."
Id. at 7. The Court refused to decide whether Chiarella breached any
duty by converting confidential information to his own use while he
was an employee of the printer. The Court found that this issue had
not been submitted to the jury. Id. at 13-14.
Fred Schreck

